Frank C. Zagare

UB Distinguished Professor
Ph.D., New York University

Phone: 716-645-8442
Office: 504 Park Hall
Curriculum Vitae (pdf)

Personal Website

Google Scholar

Areas of Teaching and Research Interest:

International Relations Theory; Conflict Processes; Interstate Crisis, Escalation, and War; Alliance Dynamics; Game Theory.

Courses Taught:

PSC 346, Individuals and World Politics
PSC 393, Game Theory and Politics
PSC 504, Approaches to the Study of International Relations
PSC 533, Formal Political Theory

Current Research:

Explaining Escalation and Limited Conflicts, Modeling Extended Deterrence, Explaining the First World War.

Brief Bio:

Frank C. Zagare is UB Distinguished Professor of Political Science. A former Vice President of the International Studies Association, Dr. Zagare is a member of the editorial board of International Interactions. He has served on the Advisory Panel of the National Science Foundation, on the editorial board of International Studies Quarterly, as a member of the Presidential Nominating Committee and the Professional Rights and Responsibilities Committee of the International Studies Association, as a Councilor for the Peace Science Society (International), as a Council Member of the Conflict Processes Section of the American Political Science Association. In  2005 he received the Susan Strange Award from the International Studies Association. He is the author, co-author or editor of six books including Perfect Deterrence (with D. Marc Kilgour), The Dynamics of Deterrence, and Game Theory: Concepts and Applications.

Selected Recent Research:

“A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Economies, 2, number 1 (2014), pp. 20 – 44.

“Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches,” [with Branislav L. Slantchev], in Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Paul F. Diehl, and James D. Morrow, [eds.], Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes. West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 23 – 41.

The Games of July: Explaining the Great War. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2011).

“Explaining the 1914 War in Europe,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 21, number 1 (January 2009), pp. 63 – 95.

The Deterrence-vs.-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence: Explaining British Policy in 1914,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], International Studies Review, 8, number 4 (December 2006), pp. 623 – 41.

Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16, number 2 (April 2004) pp. 107 – 141.


Updated 11/20/12